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XVIII. Naval and Air Bases 
(Dept. of State Bulletin, 'T ol. III, No. 63, Septc1nber 7, 1940) 
Arrangement With Great Britain for the Lease of Naval 
and Air Bases 
The texts of the 11o~es exchanged between the 
British Ambassador at \Vashington and the Sec-
retary of State on Septen1ber 2, 1940, under 'vhich 
the Govern111ent of the United States acquired the 
right to lease naval and air bases in N e'vfoundland, 
and in the islands of Bermuda,· the Bahan1as, J a-
maica, St. Lucia, Tri11idad, and Antjgua, and i11 
Britisl1 Guiana, together 'vith the texts of themes-
sage of the Preside11t to the Congress a11d the opill-
ion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, 
regardi11g the autl1ority of the President to coll-
Stlminate this arrangen1ent, are as follows: 
SIR: 
The British A1nb~sador to the Secretary of State 
BRITISH El\IBASSY, 
W~hington, D. 0., 
September~, 191;0. 
I have the honour under instructions from His J\Iajesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform 
you that in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest 
of His J\1ajesty's Government in the United l(ingdoin in 
the national security of the United States and their desire 
to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate 
effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the de-
fence of the 'Vestern Hemisphere, His J\1ajesty's GoYerninent 
will secure the grant to the Government of the United States,. 
freely and 'vithout consideration, of the lease for immediate 
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estublishn1ent and use of naval and air bases and facilities 
for entrance thereto and the operation and protection there-
of, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of 
Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay 
of Bermuda .. 
Furthermore, in view of the above and in vie"r of the 
desire of the United States to acquire additonal air and 
naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and 
without endeavouring to place a monetary or comn1ercial 
value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and 
properties involved, His 1\fajesty's Government 'vill make 
available to the United States for immediate establishn1ent 
and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance 
thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the 
eastern side of the Baha1nas, the southern coast of Jamaica, 
the western coast of St. Lucia, the 'vest coast of Trinidad 
in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in Brit-
ish Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange 
for naval and military equipn1ent and material 'vhich the 
United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's 
Government. _ 
All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period 
of ninety-nine years, free from all rent and .charges other 
than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid 
by the United States in order to compensate the owners of 
private property for loss by expropriation or damage aris-
il~g out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in 
question. 
His Majesty's Governinent, in the leases to be agreed upon, 
'vill grant to the United States for the period of the leases 
all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, 
and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces 
adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to pro-
vide access to and defence of such bases, and appropriate 
provisions for their control. 
'Vithout prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the 
United States authorities and their jurisdiction 'vithin the 
leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation bet,veen the 
jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States 'vithin 
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these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the 
territories in which these areas are situated, shall be deter-
mined by common agreement. 
The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the 
necessary seaward, coast and antiaircraft defences, the loca-
tion of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other neces-
sary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common 
agree1nent. 
His 1\Iajesty's Govern1nent are prepared to designate im-
Inecliately experts to meet \vith experts of the United States 
for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to 
agree in any particular situation, except in the case of 
Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled 
by the Secretary of State of the United States and· His 
l\fajesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
I have [etc.] 
1,he Honourable CoRDELL HuLL, 
Secretary of State of the United States, 
Washington, D. 0. 
The Secretary of State to the British 
Ambassador 
LOTHIAN 
DEPARTl\IENT OF STATE, 
Washington, September~, 1940. 
ExcELLEXCY : 
I haT"e received your note of September 2, 1940, of which 
the text is as follows : 
rHere follo\VS text of the note, printed above.] 
I a1n directed by the President to reply to your note 
as follo·w·s: 
The Govern1nent of the United States appreciates the 
declarations and the generous action of His 1\fajesty's Gov-
ernment as contained in your communication which are 
destined to enhance the national security of the United 
States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate 
effectively "~ith the other nations of the Americas in the 
defense of the 1Vestern He1nisphere. It therefore gladly 
accepts the proposals. 
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The Government of the United States will immediately 
designate experts to meet with experts designated by His 
Majesty's Government to determine upon the exact location 
of the naval and air bases mentioned in your communication 
under ackno'v ledgment. 
In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the 
Government of the United States will immediately transfer 
to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy de-
stroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton 
type. 
Accept [etc.] CoRDELL HuLL 
His Excellency 
The Right Honorable 
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN, C.H., 
British Ambassador. 
Message of the President 
To THE CoNGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress 
notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Wash-
ington and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1940, 
under which this Government has acquired the right to 
lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the 
islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trin-
idad, ahd Antigua, and in British Guiana; also a copy of an 
opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, 
regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement. 
The right to bases in N e,vfoundland and Bermuda are 
gifts-generously given and gladly received. The other 
bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty 
of our over-age destroyers. 
This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of 
peace. Still less is it a threat against any nation. It is 
an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for con-
tinental defense in the face of grave danger. 
Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative of 
a sovereign state. Under present circumstances this ex-
ercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of 
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our peace and safety. This is the n1ost in1portant action in 
the reinforcenlent or our national defense that has been 
taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then as now: consider-
ations or safety Il'Olll overseas attack ·were iundanlental. 
The value to the ''r estern He1nisphere of these outposts of 
security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been 
recognized by our country, and especially by those pri1narily 
charged 'Yith the duty of charting and organizing our own 
naval and 1nilitary defense. They are· essential to the pro-
tection or the Panan1a Canal, Central America, the Northern 
portion or South America, The Antilles, Canada, l\.fexico, 
and our own Eastern and Gulf Seaboards. Their conse-
quent i1nportance in he1nispheric ·defense is obvious. For 
these reasons I }~ave taken advantnge -or the present oppor-
tunity to acquire the1n. · · 
TIIE WHITE HousE, 
Septentber 3, 1940. 
FnANJ{LIN D. RoosEvEI.JT 
0 pinion of the Attorney Gene,--az 
AuousT 27, 1940: 
THE PRESIDENT, 
The 1Vhite House, 
l\f Y DEAR l\fR. PRESIDENT : 
In accordance with your request I have considered your 
constitutional and statutory authority to proceed by Execu-
tive Agreement with the British Govern1nent inunediatcly 
to acquire for the United States certain off-shore naval and 
air bases in the Atlantic Ocean wi_thout awaiting the inevi-
table delays which ·would accon1pany the conelusion of a 
forma 1 treaty. 
The essential characteristics or the proposal are : 
(a) The United States to acquire rights for i1n1nediate 
establishment and use of naval and air bases in N e,yfound-
land, Bermuda, the Baha1nas, Jainaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad 
and British Guiana; such rights to endure for a period of 
99 years and to include ndequate provisions for nccess to. and 
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defense o:f, such bases and appropriate provisions :for their· 
control. 
(b) In consideration it is proposed to transfer to Great 
Britain the title and possession o:f certain over-age ships 
and obsolescent military materials now the property o:f the 
United States, and certain other small patrol boats which 
though nearly completed are already obsolescent. 
(c) Upon such transfer all obligation o:f the United States 
is discharged. The acquisition consists only o:f rights, which 
the United States 1nay exercise or not at its option, and i:f 
exercised may abandon \vithout consent. The privilege o:f 
maintaining such bases is subject only to limitations neces-
sary to reconcile United States use \vith the sovereignty re-
tained by Great Britain. Our govern1nent assumes no re-
sponsibility :for civil administration o:f any territory. It 
1nakes no promise to erect structures, or n1aintain :forces 
at any point. It undertakes no defense of the possessions 
o:f any country. In short it acquires optional bases which 
rnay be developed as Congress appropriates :funds therefor, 
but the United States does not assun1e any continuing or :fu-
ture obligation, commitment or alliance. 
The questions of constitutional and statutory authority, 
with \vhich alone I am concerned, see1n to be these. 
First. ~iay such an acquisition be concluded by the Presi-
dent under an Executive Agreen1ent or must it be negotiated 
as a Treaty subject to ratification by the Senate~ 
Second. Does authority exist in the President to alienate 
the title to such ships and obsolescent 1naterials, and i:f so, 
on what conditions 1 
Third. Do the statutes o:f the United States limit the right 
to deliver the so-called "mosquito boats" now under construc-
tion or the over-age destroyers by reason of the belligerent 
status of Great Britain~ 
I 
There is, of course, no doubt concerning the authority of 
the President to negotiate \Yith the British Government 
for the proposed exchange. The only questions that 1night 
be raised in connection there\vith are (1) \vhether the 
arrange1nent 1nust be put in the f,orn1 of a treaty and await 
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ratification by the Senate or (2) \Yhether there must be 
additional legislation by the Congress. Ordinarily (and 
assu1ning the absence of enabling legislation) the question 
\vhether such an agreement can be concluded under Presi-
dential authority or whether it must a wait ratification by a 
two-thirds vote of the United States Senate involves consid-
eration of two po\vers which the Constitution vests in the 
President. 
One of these is the power of the Commander-in -Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, which is con-
ferred upon the President by the Constitution but is not de-
fined or lilnited. Happily, there has been little occasion in 
our history for the interpretation of the powers of the Presi-
dent as Co1nmander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. I 
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone to 
sustain the present proposal. But it will hardly be open to 
controversy that the vesting of such a function in the Presi-
dent also places upon him a responsibility to use all con-
stitutional authority \vhich he may possess to provide ade-
quate bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and 
air weapons of the United States at their highest efficiency 
in our defense. It seems equally beyond doubt that present 
world conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is con-
stitutionally avoidable. 
The second power to be considered is that control of 
foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the Presi-
dent as a part of the Executive function. The nature and 
extent of this power has recently been explicitly and au-
thoritatively defined by l\1r. Justice Sutherland, writing 
for the Supreme Court. In 1936, in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Oorp. et al., 299 U.S. 304, he said: 
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing 
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an 
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority 
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations-a power which does not 
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress) but 
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must 
be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of 
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the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the main-
tenance of our international relations, embarrassinent-per-
haps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success 
for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to 
be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a 
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction 
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better oppor-
tunity of knowing the conditions_ which prevail in foreign 
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He 
has his confidential sources of infor1nation. He has his 
agents in the form of diplomatic consular and other officials. 
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by the1n may be 
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it 
productive of harmful results." 
The President's power over foreign relations while "deli-
cate, plenary and exclusive'' is not unlimited. So1ne nego-
tiations involve commitments as to the future "\vhich would 
carry an obligation to exercise powers vested in the Congress. 
Such Presidential arrangements are customarily submitted 
for ratification by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before the 
future legislative power of the country is committed. How-
ever, the acquisitions which you are proposing to accept 
are without express or implied promises on the part of the 
United States to be performed in the future. The consider-
ation, which we later discuss, is completed upon transfer of 
the specified items. The Executive Agreement obtains an 
opportunity to establish naval and air bases for the protec-
tion of our coastline but it imposes no obligation upon the 
Congress to appropriate money to improve the opportunity. 
It is not necessary for the Senate to ratify an opportunity 
that entails no obligation. 
There are precedents which might be cited, but not all 
strictly pertinent. The proposition falls far short in mag-
nitude of the acquisition by President Jefferson of the Louisi-
ana Territory from a belligerent during a European war, 
the Congress later appropriating the consideration and the 
Senate later ratifying a treaty embodying. the agreement. 
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I am also ren1inded that in 1850, Secretary of State Daniel ''r ebster acquired Horse Shoe Reef, at the entrance of 
Buffalo Harbor, upon condition that the United States would 
engage to erect a lighthouse and n1aintain a light but '-vould 
erect no fortification thereon. This ''as done 'vithout await-
ing legislatiYe authority. Subsequently the Congress made 
appropriations for the lighthouse, """hich 'vas erected in 
1856. III alloy, Treaties and Conventions, Vol. 1, p. 663. 
It is not believed, however, that it is necessary here to 
rely exclusively upon your constitutional po-wer. 1\.s pointed 
out hereinafter (in discussing the second question), I think 
there is alEo an1ple statutory authority to support the acqui-
sition of these bases, and the precedents perhaps n1ost nearly 
in point are the numerous acquisitions of rights in foreign 
countries for sites of diplomatic and cor1sular establislunents-
perhaps also the trade agree1nents recently negotiated under 
statutory authority and the acquisition in 1903 of the coaling 
and naval stations and rights in Cuba under the act of 
l\farch 2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 898. In the last-
mentioned case the agreement was subsequently e1nbodied 
in a treaty but it -was only one of a number of undertakings, 
some clearly of a nature to be dealt with ordinarily by 
treaty, and the statute had required "that by way of further 
assurance the government of Cuba will embody the fore-
going provisions in a pern1anent treaty with the United 
States." 
The transaction now proposed represents only an exchange 
with no statutory requirement for the embodiment thereof in 
any treaty and involving no promises or undertakings by the 
United States that might raise the question of the propriety 
of incorporation in a treaty. I therefore advise that acqui-
sition by Executive Agreement of the rights proposed to be 
conveyed to the United States by Great Britain will not 
require ratification by the Senate. 
II 
'fhe right of the President to dispose of vessels of the 
Navy and unneeded naval material finds clear recognition 
in at least t''-ro enact1nents of the Congress and a decision of 
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the Supreme Court-and any who assert that the authority 
does not exist must assume the burden of establishing that 
both the Congress and the Supreme Court meant something 
' less than the clear import of seemingly plain language. 
By section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 141, 22 Stat. 
582, 599-600 (U. S. C., title 34, sec. 492), the Congress 
placed restrictions upon the Inethods to be followed by 
the Secretary of the Navy in disposing of naval vessels, 
which have been found unfit for further use and stricken 
from the naval registry, but by the last clause of the sec-
tion recognized and confirmed such a right in the President 
free from such limitations. It provides : 
"But no vessel of the Navy shall hereafter be sold in any 
other manner than herein provided, or for less than such 
appraised value, unless the President of the United States 
shall otherwi8rJ· direct in writing." (Underscoring [this 
print, italics] supplied.) 
In Levinson v. United States, 285 U. S. 198, 201, the 
Supre1ne Court said of this statute that "the po,ver of the 
President to direct a departure from the statute is not 
confined to a sale for less than the appraised value but 
extends to the manner of the sale," and that "the word 
'unless' qualifies both the requirements of the concluding 
clause." 
So far as concerns this statute, in 1ny opinion it leaves 
the President u.s Co1nmander-in-Chief of the Navy :free to 
1nake such disposition of naval vessels as he finds necessary 
in the public interest, and I find nothing that would indicate 
that the Congress has tried to li1nit the President's plenary 
po·wers to vessels already stricken from the naval registry. 
The President, of course, would exercise his powers only 
under the high sense of responsibility \vhich follows his rank 
as Co1nmander-in-Chief of his nation's defense forces. 
Furthermore, I find in no other statute or in the decisions 
any attempted limitations upon the plenary powers of the 
President as Comn1ander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy 
and as the head of the State in its relations with foreign 
countries to enter into the proposed arrange1nents for the 
transfer to the British Government of certain over-age de-
stroyers and obsolescent n1ilitary Inaterial except the li1ni-
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tations recently imposed by section 14 (a) of the act of 
J nne 28, 1940 (Public No. 671). 1,his section, it 'vill be 
noted, clearly recognizes the authority to n1ake transfers 
and seeks only to impose certain restrictions thereon. The 
section reads as follows: 
''SEc. 14. (a) Notwithstanding the provision of any other 
law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft, muni-
tions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United States 
has title, in whole or in part, or which have been con-
tracted for, shall hereafter be transferred, exchang~d, sold, 
or otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever unless 
the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of naval material, 
and the Chief of Staff of the Army in the case of military 
1naterial, shall first certify that such material is not essential 
to the defense of the United States." 
Thus to prohibit action by the constitutionally-created 
Conunander-in-Chief except upon authorization of a stat-
utory officer subordinate in rank is of questionable con-
stitutionality. However, since the statute requires certifi-
cation only of matters as to which you would wish, irrespec-
tive of the statute, to be satisfied, and as the legislative 
history of the section indicates that no arbitrary res~riction 
is intended, it seems unnecessary to raise the question of 
constitutionality which such a provision would otherwise 
invite. 
I am informed that the destroyers involved here are the 
survivors of a fleet of over 100 built at about the same time 
and under the same design. During the year 1930, 58 of 
these were decommissioned with a view toward sera pping 
and a corresponding number were recommissioned as 
replace1nents. Usable material and equipment from the 
58 vessels removed from the service were transferred 
to the reco1nmissioned vessels to recondition and mod-
ernize them, and other usable material and equipment 
were removed and the vessels stripped. They were then 
stricken from the navy register, and 50 of them were sold 
as scrap for prices ranging from $5,260 to $6,800 per vessel, 
and the remaining 8 were used for such purposes as target 
vessels, experimental construction tests, and temporary bar-
racks. The surviving destroyers no'v under consideration 
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have been reconditioned and are in service, but all of them 
are over-age, most o:f them by several years. 
In construing this statute in its application to such a 
situation it is in1portant to riote that this subsection as 
originally proposed in the Senate 9ill provided that the 
appropriate staff officer shall first certify that "such material 
is not essential to and cannot be used in the defense o:f the 
United States." Senator Barkley and others objected to 
the subsection as so worded on the ground that it would 
prevent the release and exchange of surplus or used planes 
and other supplies :for sale to the British and that it would 
consequently nullify the provisions o:f the bill (see section 1 
of the act of July 2, 1940, H. R. 9850, Public No. 703) which 
the Senate had passed several days earlier :for that very 
purpose. Although Senator Walsh stated that he did not 
think the proposed subsection had that effect, he agreed 
to strike out the words "and cannot be used." Senator 
Barkley observed that he thought the modified language 
provided "a much more elastic term." Senator 'Valsh :fur-
ther stated that he would bear in mind in conference the 
views of Senator Barkley and others, and that he had "no 
desire or purpose to go beyond the present Jaw, but to have 
some certificate filed as to whether the property is surplus 
or not." (Cong. Rec., June 21, 1940, pp. 13370-13371) 
In view of this legislative history it is clear that the Con-
gress did not intend to prevent the certification for transfer, 
exchange, sale or disposition of property merely because it 
is still used or usable or of possible value :for :future use. 
The statute does not contemplate mere transactions in scrap, 
yet exchange or sale except as sera p would hardly be pos-
sible if confined to material whose usefulness is entirely 
gone. It need only be certified as not essential, and "essen-
tial," usually the equivalent of vital or indispensable, :falls 
far short o:f "used~' or "usable." 
Moreover, as has been indicated, the congressional authori-
zation is not merely o:f a sale, which might imply only a 
cash transaction. It also authorizes equipment to be "trans-
ferred", "exchanged" or "other,vise disposed o:f"; and in 
connection with material of this kind :for which there is 
no open market value is never absolute but only relative-
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and chiefly related to " ·hat nuty be had in exchange or 
replacement. 
In vie'v of the character of the transactions contemplated, 
as 'veil as the legislative history, the conclusion is inescap-
able that the Congress has not sought by section 14 (a) 
to i1npose an arbitrary limitation upon the judg1nent of the 
highest staff officers as to "·hether a transfer, exchange or 
other disposition of specific items "~auld impair our essen-
tial defenses; Specific items must be weighed in relation 
to our total defense position before and after an exchange 
or disposition. Any other construction would be a virtual 
prohibition of any sale, exchange or disposition of 1naterial 
or supplies so long as they ""ere capable of use, however in-
effective, and such a prohibition obviously 'vas not: and "·as 
not intended to be, written into the law. 
It is 1ny opinion that in proceeding under section 14 (a) 
appropriate staff officers may and should consider remain-
ing useful life, strategic i1nportance, obsolescence, and all 
other factors affecting defense value, not only 'vith respect 
to what the Govern1nent of the United States gives up in 
any exchange or transfer, but also with respect to 'vhat the 
Govern1nent receives. In this situation good business sense 
is good legal sense. 
I therefore advise that the appropriate staff officers n1ay, 
and should, certify under section 14 (a) that ships and 
n1aterial involved in a sale or exchange are not essential 
to the defense of the United States if in their judgment 
the consununation of i he transaction does not impair or 
weaken the total defense of the United States, and cer-
tainly so where the consummation of the arrange1nent ""'ill 
strengthen the total defensive position of the nation. 
''rith specific reference . to the proposed agree1nent ivith 
the Govenunent of Great Britain for the acquisition of naval 
and air bases, it is 1ny opinion that the Chief of Naval 
Operations may, and should~ certify under section 14 (a) 
that the destroyers involved are not e8sential to the defense 
of the United States if in his jndg1nent the exchange of 
such destroyers for such naval and air bases ""'ill strengthen 
rather than i1npair the totnl defense of the United State8. 
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I hnve previously indicated that in n1y opnuon there is 
statutory authority for the acquisition of the naval and air 
bases in exchange for the vessels and material. 'fhe ques-
tion was not 1nore fully treated at that point because de-
pendent upon the statutes above discussed and ''hich re-
quired consideration in this section of the opinion. It is 
to be borne in mind that these statutes clearly recognize 
and deal with the authority to 1nake dispositions by sale, 
transfer, exchange or otherwise; that they do not in1pose 
any limitations concerning individuals, corporations or gov-
ernlnents to 'vhich such dispositions 1nay be 1nade; and that 
they do not specify or litnit in any Inanner the consideration 
which may enter into an exchange. There is no reason what-
ever for holding that sales may not be n1ade to or ex-
changes 1nade with a foreign goyern1nent or that in such 
a case a treaty is contemplated. This is e1nphasized when 
we consider that the transactions in son1e cases may be quite 
unimportant, perhaps only dispositions of scrap, and that 
a do1nestic buyer (unless restrained by son1e authorized con-
tract or e1nbargo) would be quite free to dispose of his pur-
chase as he pleased. Furthermore, section 14 (a) of the 
act of June 28, 1940, supra, was enacted by the Congress 
in full conten1plation of transfers for ultimate delivery to 
foreign belligerent nations. Possibly it n1ay be said that 
the authority for exchange of naval vessels and material 
presupposes the acquisition of so1nething of value to the 
Navy or, at least, to the national defense. Certainly I can 
imply no narrower limitation when the law is wholly silent 
in this respect. Assun1ing that there is, however, at least 
the li:nitation which I have 1nentioned, it is fully met in 
the acquisition of rights to maintain needed bases. And 
if, as I hold, the statute la'v authorizes the exchange of ves-
sels and material for other vessels and 1naterial or, equally, 
for the right to establish bases, it is an inescapable corollary 
that the statute law also authorizes the acquisition of the 
ships or material or bases which forn1 the consideration for 
the exchange. 
III 
vVhether the statutes of the United States prevent the 
dispatch to Great Britain, a belligerent power, of the so-
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called "mosquito boats" no'v under construction or the 
over-age destroyers depends upon the interpretation to be 
placed on section 3 of title V of the act of June 15, 1917, 
c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 222. 'I'his section reads: 
"Dllring a "~ar in 'vhich the United States is a neutral 
nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdictio~1 
of the United States any vessel, built, ar1ned, or equippr.d 
as a vessel of "·ar, or converted from a private vessel into 
a vessel of 'Yar, "~ith any intent or under any agreement or 
contract, written or oral, that such vessel shall be delivered 
to a belligerent nation, or to an agent, officer, or citizen of 
such nation, or 'vith reasonable cause to believe that the said 
vessel shall or 'Yill be e1nployed in the service of any such 
belligerent nation after its departure from the jurisdiction 
of the United States." 
This section must be read in the light of section 2 of the 
sa1ne act and the rules of international law 'vhich the Con-
gress states that it was its intention to implement. (H. Rep. 
No. 30, 65th Con g., 1st Sess., p. 9.) So read, it is clear that 
it is inapplicable to vessels, like the over-age destroyers, 
which were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into, 
vessels of 'var with the intent that they should enter the 
service of a belligerent. If the section 'vere not so construed, 
it \vould render meaningless section 2 of the act which au-
thorizes the President to detain any armed vessel until he 
is satisfied that it will not engage in hostile operations before· 
it reaches a neutral or belligerent port. The two sections 
are intelligible and reconcilable only if read in light of the 
traditional rules of international la,v. 'I'hese are clearly 
stated by Oppenheim in his work on International Law, 
5th ed., Vol. 2, sec. 334, pp. 574-576: 
"Whereas a neutral is in no 'vise obliged by his duty 
of impartiality to prevent his subjects from selling arn1cd 
vessels to the belligerents, such armed vessels being merely 
contraband of \Var, a neutral is bound to employ the means 
at his disposal to prevent his subjects from building, fitting 
out, or arming, to the order of either belHgerent, vesse.is 
intended to be used as men-of-war, and to prevent the de-
parture from his j11risdiction of any vessel which, by order 
of either belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use. The 
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· difference between selling armed vessels to belligerents and 
building them to order is usually defined in the following 
way: 
"An ar1ned ship, being contraband of 'var, is in no 'vise 
different from other kinds of contraband, provided that she 
is not manned in a neutral port, so that she can co1nmit 
hostilities at once after having reached the open sea. 1\ 
subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or arms a 
merchantman, not to the order of a belligerent, but intenJ-
ing to sell her to a belligerent, does not differ from a manu-
facturer of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent. 
There is nothing to prevent a neutral £ro1n allo,ving his 
subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver then1 to belliger-
ents, either in a neutral port or in a belligerent 
port * * * 
"On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds ar1ned 
ships to the order of a belligerent, he prepares the n1eans 
of naval operations, since the ships, on sailing outside the 
neutral territorial waters and takjng in a crew and amn1un i-
tion, can at once commit hostilities. Thus, through the 
carrying out of the order of the belligerent, the neutral terri-
tory has been made the base of naval operations; and as the 
duty of impartiality includes an obligation to prevent either 
belligerent from making neutral territory the base of mili-
tary or naval operations, a neutral violates his neutrality by 
not preventing his subjects from carrying out an order of 
a belligerent for the building and fitting out of Inen-of-wat. 
This distinction, although of course logically correct, is hair-
splitting. But as, according to the present la,v, neutral 
States need not prevent their subjects from supplying arn1s 
and ammunition to belligerents, it will probably continue to 
be drawn." 
Viewed in the light of the above, I am of the opinion 
that this statute does prohibit the release and transfer to 
the British Government of the so-called "mosquito boats'' 
now under construction for the United States Navy. If 
these boats were released to the British Government, it 
would be legally impossible for that Government to take 
the1n out of this country after their completion, since to the 
extent of such completion at least they would have been built~ 
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anned, or equipped 'vith the intent, or 'vith reasonable cause 
to believe, that they would enter the service of a belligerent 
after being sent out of the jurisdiction of the United States. 
This "rill not be true, ho,vever, 'vith respect to the over-
age destroyers, since they 'vere clearly not built, armed, or 
equipped 'vith any such intent or with reasonable cause to 
believe that they would ever enter the service of a belligerent. 
In this connection it has been noted that during the war 
bet 'veen Russia and Japan in 1904 and 1905, the German 
Govern1nent permitted the sale to Russia of torpedo boats 
and also of ocean liners belonging to its auxiliary navy. 
See "\Vheaton's International Law, 6th ed. (l{eith), Vol. 2, 
p. 977. 
IV 
Accordingly, you are respectfully advised: 
(a) That the proposed arrangement may be concluded as 
an Exectitive Agreement, effectiYe "rithout a'vaiting rati-
fication. 
(b) That there is presidential power to transfer title and 
possession of the proposed considerations upon certification 
by a ppropriat.e staff officers. 
(c) That the dispatch of the so-called "1nosquito boats" 
'vould constitute a violation of the statute la'v of the United 
States, but with that exception there is no legal obstacle to 
the consummation of the transaction, in accordance, of 
course, 'vith the applicable provisions of the Neutrality Act 
as to delivery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RoBERT H. JACKSON, 
Attorney General. 
